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Abstract
In this paper, we introduce a natural learning rule for mean field games with finite
state and action space, the so-called myopic adjustment process. The main motiva-
tion for these considerations are the complex computations necessary to determine
dynamic mean-field equilibria, which make it seem questionable whether agents
are indeed able to play these equilibria. We prove that the myopic adjustment pro-
cess converges locally towards stationary equilibria with deterministic equilibrium
strategies under rather broad conditions. Moreover, for a two-strategy setting, we
also obtain a global convergence result under stronger, yet intuitive conditions.
Keywords: Mean Field Games, Learning in Games, Finite State Space
JEL Classification: C73, C70
1. Introduction
Mean field games have been introduced by Lasry and Lions (2007) and Huang et al.
(2006) in order to make dynamic games with a large number of players tractable. The
central idea is to approximate these games with many players by a game with a contin-
uum of anonymous players. Thereafter a vibrant field of research emerged in particular
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concerning games where the dynamics of the individual players are described by diffu-
sions. For a first overview consider the monographs by Bensoussan et al. (2013) and by
Carmona and Delarue (2018a,b) or the lecture notes by Cardaliaguet (2013). However, a
central problem for applications is that equilibria are described by forward-backward sys-
tems of (stochastic) differential equations and are, therefore, notoriously intractable.
Recently, also mean field games with finite state space have been considered for example
Gomes et al. (2013); Cecchin and Fischer (2018); Belak et al. (2019); Carmona and
Wang (2018); Doncel et al. (2019); Neumann (2020a) and Carmona and Delarue (2018a,
Section 7.2). Moreover, several applications have been considered including the spread of
corruption, botnet defence, paradigm shift in science and consumer choice (Besancenot
and Dogguy, 2015; Kolokoltsov and Bensoussan, 2016; Kolokoltsov and Malafeyev, 2017;
Gomes et al., 2014). In Neumann (2020a) stationary equilibria for mean field games
with finite state and action space have been considered and results yielding an explicit
characterization of these equilibria have been derived. For applications it is now clearly
desirable to understand whether stationary equilibria are an adequate description of
agents’ behaviour. One approach is to discuss the question in how far these equilibria
are suitable limit objects of dynamic equilibria when the finite time horizon tends to
infinity (consider Kolokoltsov and Malafeyev (2018) for the analysis of an example).
The second approach is to understand in how far stationary equilibria arise when agents
apply certain only partly rational decision rules. This approach is a classical one in
standard game theory and known as learning.
Why players should play equilibrium strategies is a classical concern. The explanation
that agents arrive at these strategies from “introspection and computation” is challenged
by many facts: The computational complexity of the problems at hand, the question
which equilibrium to choose in case of multiple equilibria and experimental evidence
(Fudenberg and Levine, 1998). Because it was observed in experiments that agents
“learn” to play equilibria after some time, many authors focussed on the definition
and analysis of partially rational “learning rules” (for example fictitious play or partial
best response) mostly for static games. For an overview consider the monograph by
Fudenberg and Levine (1998) or the survey by Nachbar (2009).
Recently, learning has also been discussed for mean field games with diffusion-based
dynamics: On the one hand, Cardaliaguet and Hadikhanloo (2017) introduced fictitious
play for repeated games with finite time horizon which thereafter has been analysed
in subsequent publications (Hadikhanloo, 2017; Briani and Cardaliaguet, 2018) and ex-
tended to discrete time finite state mean field games with finite time horizon (Hadikhan-
loo, 2018). On the other hand, Mouzouni (2018) introduced a learning procedure similar
to the myopic adjustment process considered here. He proved existence and local conver-
gence under strong assumptions (quadratic Hamiltonian and Lasry-Lions monotonicity
condition). We highlight, that the methods for diffusion-based mean field games cannot
be adapted to our setting of a mean field game with finite state and action space, since
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the crucial assumption for most methods (a unique optimizer of the Hamiltonian) is
typically not satisfied (see Neumann (2020a, Remark 2.5)).
This is the first paper that discusses learning in mean field games with finite state and
action space. We will introduce a myopic adjustment process, where agents choose to
play a best response for the scenario that the current population distribution will persist
for all future times. This definition yields to a formulation of this process as a differential
inclusion and we can prove existence of this process under a continuity assumption.
Then we discuss under which conditions we can expect local convergence towards sta-
tionary equilibria. First, we explain that a general convergence result is only possible
for deterministic stationary equilibria. Thereafter, we obtain a first convergence result
for dynamics constant in m. Namely, under a classical irreducibility condition we es-
tablish local convergence towards stationary equilibria with a deterministic equilibrium
strategy. For general dynamics, under some technical conditions as well as a condition
similar to the irreducibility condition in the constant case, we are again able to prove
convergence towards stationary equilibria with a deterministic equilibrium strategy. We
conclude the analysis of local convergence with the discussion of examples.
In the end of the paper, we turn to the question of global convergence for games with
only two sensible deterministic stationary strategies. Under certain technical conditions,
we obtain that whenever the instantaneous change of the population is non-orthogonal
to the set of points where both strategies are simultaneously optimal, global convergence
towards deterministic stationary strategies happens or the trajectories stay in the set
where both strategies are simultaneously optimal. In examples this is often enough to
prove global convergence towards stationary equilibria in mixed strategies, which we
illustrate in an example.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the mean field game
model considered in this paper. Section 3 then introduces the myopic adjustment process
and justifies its definition as a sensible partially rational learning rule. Moreover, it
presents the myopic adjustment process for a simple example. In Section 4 we study the
local convergence of the myopic adjustment process and in Section 5 we then study the
global convergence for the special case of two strategies.
2. Stationary Equilibria of Mean Field Games with
Finite State and Action Space
This section describes the mean field game model. The setup is the same as in Neumann
(2020a) and we refer the reader to this paper for details regarding well-definition and
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intuitions. Moreover, we remark that the model has been first introduced in an analytic
formulation and without the notion of stationary equilibria in Doncel et al. (2019).
Let S = {1, . . . , S} (S > 1) be the set of possible states of each player and let A =
{1, . . . , A} be the set of possible actions. With P(S) we denote the probability simplex
over S and with P(A) the probability simplex overA. A (mixed) strategy is a measurable
function pi : S × [0,∞)→ P(A), (i, t) 7→ (piia(t))a∈A with the interpretation that piia(t)
is the probability that at time t and in state i the player chooses action a. A strategy
pi = d : S × [0,∞) → P(A) is deterministic if it satisfies for all t ≥ 0 and for all i ∈ S
that there is an a ∈ A such that dia(t) = 1 and dia′ = 0 for all a′ ∈ A \ {a}. Sometimes
the following equivalent representation is helpful: Namely, we represent a deterministic
strategy as a function d : S × [0,∞) → A, (i, t) 7→ di(t) with the interpretation that
di(t) = a states that at time t in state i action a is chosen. A stationary strategy is a
map pi : S × [0,∞)→ P(A) such that piia(t) = piia for all t ≥ 0. With Π we denote the
set of all (mixed) strategies and with Πs the set of all stationary strategies. Similarly, we
denote by D the set of all deterministic strategies and by Ds the set of all deterministic
stationary strategies.
Let for all a ∈ A and m ∈ P(S) the matrices (Q··a(m))a∈A be conservative generators,
that is Qija(m) ≥ 0 for all i, j ∈ S with i 6= j and
∑
j∈S Qija(m) = 0 for all i ∈ S.
The individual dynamics of each player given a Lipschitz continuous flow of population
distributions m : [0,∞) → P(S) and a strategy pi : S × [0,∞) → P(A) are given as
a Markov process Xpi(m) with given initial distribution x0 ∈ P(S) and infinitesimal
generator given by the Q(t)-matrix
(Qpi(m(t), t))ij =
∑
a∈A
Qija(m(t))piia(t).
Given the initial condition x0 ∈ P(S), the goal of each player is to maximize his expected
discounted reward, which is given by
Vx0(pi,m) = E
[∫ ∞
0
(∑
a∈A
rXpi(m)a(m(t))piXpi(m)a(t)
)
e−βtdt
]
, (1)
where r : S×A×P(S)→ R is a real-valued function and β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor.
That is, for a fixed flow of population distributions m : [0,∞) 7→ P(S) the individual
agent’s decision problem is a Markov decision process with expected discounted reward
criterion and time-inhomogeneous reward functions and transition rates.
In this paper we work under the following standing assumption, which ensures the well-
definition of the model as well as the existence of dynamic as well as stationary equilibria
(Neumann, 2020a):
Assumption A1. For all i, j ∈ S and all a ∈ A the function m 7→ Qija(m) mapping
from P(S) to R is Lipschitz-continuous in m . For all i ∈ S and all a ∈ A the function
m 7→ ria(m) mapping from P(S) to R is continuous in m.
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Definition 2.1. Given an initial distribution m0 ∈ P(S), a mean field equilibrium is
a pair (m,pi) consisting of a flow of population distributions m : [0,∞) → P(S) with
m(0) = m0 and a strategy pi : S × [0,∞)→ P(A) such that
• the distribution of the process Xpi(m) at time t is given by m(t), and
• V m0(pi,m) ≥ V m0(pi′,m) for all pi′ ∈ Π.
Definition 2.2. A stationary mean field equilibrium is given by a stationary strategy
pi and a vector m ∈ P(S) such that
• the law of Xpi(m) at any point in time t is given by m, and
• for any initial distribution x0 ∈ P(S) we have V x0(pi,m) ≥ V x0(pi′,m) for all
pi′ ∈ Π.
3. The Myopic Adjustment Process
In general, it is not possible to compute dynamic mean field equilibria for the considered
game; it is not even possible to explicitly characterize solutions of the individual control
problem for a given non-constant flow of population distributions. Moreover, also in the
case of a finite time horizon, the search for equilibria can only be reduced to a forward-
backward system of ODEs, which can, most of the time, be only solved numerically (see
Belak et al. (2019)). The aim of this section is to motivate and define a reasonable
alternative decision mechanism for the agents.
In contrast to Cardaliaguet and Hadikhanloo (2017) we cannot assume that the game
is played repeatedly, but instead we have to assume that the agent changes his strategy
during the game. For this we note that the game at time t with current distribution m
is, due to the time-homogeneous formulation and the infinite time horizon, equivalent to
the game started at time 0 with initial distribution m. Moreover, we remind ourselves
that the influence of the individual agent on the game characteristics and thus on the
payoff of the other players is negligible. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the
agents do not try to influence the other players’ choices, but that they only maximize
their own payoff. Because of time-homogeneity and the negligible influence on other
players we assume that the agents choose Markovian strategies that only depend on the
current state and current population distribution.
We assume that the agent when choosing an optimal strategy given the current popula-
tion distribution m assumes that the population distribution is constant. This myopia
is not only a classical simplification, but the only sensible prediction an agent can com-
pute in this setting. Indeed, in general one cannot compute optimal strategies for the
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Markov decision processes with non-stationary transition rates and rewards that arise
in this setting. Given such a constant prediction of the behaviour of the population,
the optimization problem becomes a tractable Markov decision process with stationary
transition rates and rewards. It is well known that there is always an optimal stationary
strategy for the considered optimization problem (Guo and Herna´ndez-Lerma, 2009) and
it is again natural to assume that agents choose such a stationary strategy.
We remark that this assumption that agents choose a stationary strategy is classical and
that there are several conceptual reasons for the use of these strategies (see Maskin and
Tirole (2001)). Namely, stationary Markov strategies are the simplest (rational) form of
decision-making in this context. Moreover, this type of strategies is related to subgame
perfection, which is as discussed earlier a reasonable requirement in our setting. Indeed,
these strategies ensure that a game with the same relevant characteristics (i.e. current
state and population distribution) is played in the same way. Finally, the restriction on
this type of strategies reduces the number of possible best responses and thus increase
predictive power.
For our purpose now the following result explicitly characterizing the set of all optimal
stationary strategies given a constant flow of population distributions proves to be useful
(see Neumann (2020a, Section 3)): Let us denote by V ∗j (m) the unique solution of the
optimality equation for the Markov decision process and define
Oi(m) =: argmaxa∈A
{
ria(m) +
∑
j∈S
Qija(m)V
∗
j (m)
}
.
Furthermore, we set
D(m) := {d : S → A|d(i) ∈ Oi(m) for all i ∈ S}.
Then the set of all optimal stationary strategies is given by conv(D(m)).
We argued that every agent will choose a strategy from the set conv(D(m)). However,
we cannot assume that all agents choose a particular strategy nor that the agents or
groups of them agree on a common strategy. Moreover, we also cannot describe which
agents will choose which strategy. The only sensible assumption is that the population
chooses aggregately a strategy from the set conv(D(m)). The next lemma describes how
the population’s distribution evolves if all agents adopt this decision mechanism:
Lemma 3.1. Let m : [0,∞)→ P(S) be the distribution of the population, where at time
t ≥ 0 any agent chooses a strategy from conv(D(m)). Then
m˙(t) ∈ F (m(t)) := conv

(∑
i∈S
∑
a∈A
miQija(m(t))dia
)
j∈S
: d ∈ D(m(t))
 (2)
for almost all t ≥ 0.
6
Proof. Using the Kolmogorov forward equation, the individual agent’s dynamics given
any strategy pi ∈ Πs can be equivalently described as being the solution of the ordinary
differential equation (in the sense of Caratheodory)
x˙j(t) =
∑
i∈S
xi(t)
∑
a∈A
Qija(m(t))piia(t)
with initial condition x(0) = x0. Since the aggregated strategy pi of the population
satisfies pi ∈ conv(D(m)) the desired claim follows.
With these preparations we define the myopic adjustment process as a solution of the
differential inclusion in the sense of Deimling (1992) given by (2). Namely, a trajectory of
the myopic adjustment process is an absolutely continuous function m : [0,∞)→ P(S)
such that
m˙(t) ∈ F (m(t)) for almost all t ≥ 0, m(0) = m0. (3)
We remark, that the use of differential inclusion as a modelling tool for situations where
uncertainty, the absence of control or a variety of available dynamics occurs is classical
(Aubin and Cellina, 1984).
Before we start the analysis of the long-term behaviour, we note, relying a classical
existence result for differential inclusions, that under Assumption A1 always a trajectory
of the differential inclusion exists. The proof can be found in the appendix A.
Theorem 3.2. The differential inclusion defined by (2) and (3) admits a solution m :
[0,∞)→ P(S).
For our purpose, it is central to understand how stationary equilibria and the trajectories
of the myopic adjustment process interact. The following observation, which is classical
for many learning procedures, is a first step:
Remark 3.3. By definition, a point is a stationary point of (3) if and only if it is a
stationary mean field equilibrium. 4
In the Section 4 we will analyse, whether the myopic adjustment process started close
to a stationary equilibrium converges towards it. Thereafter, in Section 5 we analyse
in the setting of two sensible deterministic stationary strategies under which conditions
convergence towards some stationary equilibrium irrespective of the starting point can
be expected.
We conclude this section by discussing the shape of the myopic adjustment process for
an example linked to consumer choice in the mobile phone sector, for which previously
in Neumann (2020a) the stationary equilibria have been computed:
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Example 3.4. The agents can choose between two providers and their utility is increasing
in the share of customers using the same provider. The agents can switch the provider
facing a time-unit cost c. However, the decision is not implemented immediately, but
according to a Poisson process with rate b. The formal description of the model is given
as follows: Let S = {1, 2} and A = {stay , change}. Let δ > 0 be small and define
fδ : R→ R y 7→
{
1
2δ
y2 + δ
2
if y ≤ δ
y if y > δ
.
Then the transition rates and rewards are giben by
Qchange(m) =
(−b b
b −b
)
Qstay(m) =
(− 
 −
)
rchange(m) =
(
ln(fδ(m1)) + s1 − c
ln(fδ(m2)) + s2 − c
)
rstay(m) =
(
ln(fδ(m1)) + s1
ln(fδ(m2)) + s2
)
,
where , b, s1, s2 and c are positive constants with  < b.
Let us write (a1, a2) for the deterministic strategy d such that d(i) = ai. In Neumann
(2020a) it is then shown that
D(m) =

(change, stay) if m1 < k1
conv{(change, stay), (stay , stay)} if m1 = k1
(stay , stay) if k1 < m1 < k2
conv{(stay , stay), (stay , change)} if m1 = k2
(stay , change) if m1 > k2
,
where
k1 =
exp
(
− c(β+2)
b− − s1 + s2
)
1 + exp
(
− c(β+2)
b− − s1 + s2
) and k2 = exp
(
c(β+2)
b− − s1 + s2
)
1 + exp
(
c(β+2)
b− − s1 + s2
) .
8
Thus, the myopic adjustment process is defined as a solution of the differential inclusion
m˙(t) ∈ F (m(t)) with
F (m) =

(
−bm1(t) + m2(t)
bm1(t)− m2(t)
)
if m1(t) < k1
conv
{(
−bm1(t) + m2(t)
bm1(t)− m2(t)
)
,
(
−m1(t) + m2(t)
m1(t)− m2(t)
)}
if m1(t) = k1(
−m1(t) + m2(t)
m1(t)− m2(t)
)
if k1 < m1(t) < k2
conv
{(
−m1(t) + m2(t)
m1(t)− m2(t)
)
,
(
−m1(t) + bm2(t)
m1(t)− bm2(t)
)}
if m1(t) = k2(
−m1(t) + bm2(t)
m1(t)− bm2(t)
)
if m1(t) > k2
.
In Figure 1 we illustrate the behaviour of this process for a parameter choice that yields
for any initial condition to a unique solution of the differential inclusion.
4. Local Convergence
This section discusses the question of local convergence, that is we analyse under which
conditions we can expect that for an initial condition close to a stationary equilibrium
the trajectories of (3) converge towards that equilibrium.
Local convergence of the myopic adjustment process will in general not happen if the
equilibrium distribution m¯ satisfies |D(m¯)| > 1. Indeed, in this case there are points
arbitrary close to the equilibrium at which a different strategy than the equilibrium
strategy is optimal and for which we cannot tell anything about the behaviour of the
trajectories given this strategy – it might happen that we are pushed away from the
equilibrium. Thus, it remains to verify whether we have local convergence towards a
stationary deterministic mean field equilibrium (m¯, d) where d is the unique optimal
strategy at m¯. As a first step, we observe the following:
Lemma 4.1. Let d be the unique optimal stationary strategy for m¯ (that is D(m¯) = {d}).
Then there is an  > 0 such that for all m′ ∈ N(m¯) we have D(m′) = {d}.
Proof. Let V d(m) denote the expected discounted reward if the player chooses strategy
d and the population distribution is m for all times. In Neumann (2020a, Section 3) it
is shown that m 7→ V d(m) is continuous. Since D(m¯) = {d}, we have V d(m¯) > V dˆ(m¯)
pointwise for all dˆ ∈ Ds \ {d}. By continuity there is an  > 0 such that V d(m′) >
9
Figure 1: Illustration of Example 3.4: The figure shows m1(t) for several trajectories
of the myopic adjustment process given different initial conditions. The blue
vertical lines represent the thresholds at which the set of optimal strategies
changes.
V dˆ(m′) pointwise for all m′ ∈ N(m¯) and dˆ ∈ Ds \ {d}. Thus, D(m′) = {d} for all
m′ ∈ N(m¯).
This lemma now yields that for all m′ ∈ N(m¯) we have F (m′) = {(Qd(m′))Tm′}. Thus,
it suffices to investigate whether there is a δ > 0 such that for all m0 ∈ P(S) satisfying
|m0 − m¯| < δ we have that the solution of m˙(t) = (Qd(m(t)))Tm(t) lies in N(m¯) for
all t ≥ 0 and converges towards m¯. This question is closely linked to the notion of
asymptotically stable solutions of autonomous ordinary differential equations x˙ = f(x).
However, we do not consider arbitrary initial conditions in Nδ(x¯), but only those that
lie in P(S). Moreover, we always face, since Q(m) is conservative for all m ∈ P(S), a
zero eigenvalue of the Jacobian. Thus, general stability results are not applicable.
The first positive result we present covers the case where the dynamics given the equi-
librium strategy are constant, that is m˙ = (Qd)Tm. In this setting it is even possible to
explicitly characterize what “close” means:
Theorem 4.2. Let (m¯, d) be a stationary mean field equilibrium such that D(m¯) = {d}
(that is, d is the unique optimal strategy at m¯). Furthermore, assume that Qd(m) is
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constant in m and an irreducible generator. Then there is a δ > 0 such that any solution
of the myopic adjustment process (3) with initial condition m0 ∈ P(S)∩Nδ(m¯) converges
exponentially fast to m¯, i.e. there are constants C1, C2 > 0 such that
||m(t)− m¯|| ≤ C1e−C2t for all t ≥ 0.
Remark 4.3. We can explicitly determine δ > 0: Namely, let λ1, . . . , λn be the eigenvalues
of Qd. By Asmussen (2003, Corollary 4.9) there is an eigenvalue λi = 0 with multiplicity
one and eigenvector m¯ and such that Re(λj) < 0 for all j 6= i. Without loss of generality
assume that i = 1 and denote by m(λj) the multiplicity of λj and by (v
0
j , . . . , v
m(λj)−1
j )
the basis of the generalized eigenspace Eig(λj) := ker
(
(Qd)T − λjI
)m(λj). Choose  > 0
such that for all m˜ ∈ N(m¯) it holds that D(m˜) = {d} and define
Ckj :=
m(λj)−1∑
l=0
e−l
ll
l!(−Re(λj))l
∣∣∣∣∣∣((Qd)T − λjI)l vlj∣∣∣∣∣∣
for all j ∈ {2, . . . , n} and k ∈ {0, . . . ,m(λj)− 1}, then
δ :=
/2 ·minj∈{2,...,n},k∈{0,...,m(λj)} ||vki ||
minj∈{2,...,n},k∈{0,...,m(λj)}C
k
i
is a suitable choice.
The proof relies on the classical result that the solutions of a linear ODE with initial con-
dition v ∈ Eig(λ) for some eigenvalue λ is given by x(t) = eλt∑m(λ)−1l=0 tl/l! ((Qd)T − λI)l v
(Logemann and Ryan, 2014, Theorem 2.11) as well as a sensible treatment of the eigen-
value structure of Qd:
Proof. Let us use the same notation as in Remark 4.3. We note that
(m¯, v02, . . . , v
m(λ2)−1
2 , . . . , v
0
n, . . . , v
m(λn)−1
i )
is a basis of RS. Thus, for any initial condition m0 ∈ RS we find a unique set of
constants (αki ) such that m0 = α
0
1m¯ +
∑n
i=2
∑m(λi)−1
k=0 α
k
i v
k
i . By Logemann and Ryan
(2014, Theorem 2.11) and since m¯ is the eigenvector for the eigenvalue 0 we obtain
m(t) = α01m¯+
n∑
i=2
eλit
m(λi)−1∑
k=0
tl
l!
((Qd)T − λiI)lvki .
Since the continuous time Markov chain with generator Qd is ergodic, we have that
m(t) → m¯ for t → ∞. Since moreover Re(λi) < 0 it holds that α01 = 1. Thus, using
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that the function t 7→ eRe(λi)t tl
l!
has a unique global maximum in [0,∞) at t = − l
Re(λi)
,
we obtain
||m(t)− m¯|| =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=2
eλit
m(λi)−1∑
k=0
αki
m(λi)−1∑
l=0
(
(Qd)T − λi
)l
vki
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
n∑
i=2
m(λi)−1∑
k=0
αki
m(λi)−1∑
l=0
eRe(λi)t
tl
l!
∣∣∣∣∣∣((Qd)T − λiI)l vki ∣∣∣∣∣∣
 (4)
≤
n∑
i=2
m(λi)−1∑
k=0
|αki |Cki .
If m0 ∈ Nδ(m¯) ∩ P(S), then
||m0 − m¯|| =
n∑
i=2
m(λi)−1∑
k=0
|αki |
∣∣∣∣vki ∣∣∣∣ < mini,k ||vki ||maxi,k Cki ,
which implies
∑n
i=2
∑m(λi)−1
k=0 |αki |Cki < . Therefore, m(t) ∈ N(m¯) for all t ≥ 0. The
exponential convergence then follows from (4).
Also in the case of general dynamics we can provide a similar positive statement. How-
ever, we have to impose additional conditions, since the necessary eigenvalue structure
does not follow immediately in this setting:
Theorem 4.4. Let (m¯, d) be a stationary mean field equilibrium such that D(m¯) = {d}
(that is, d is the unique optimal strategy at m¯). Let O ⊇ P(S) be an open set such
that Qd : O → RS×S is componentwise Lipschitz continuous, the matrix Qd(m) is a
transition rate matrix for all m ∈ P(S) and the function fd : O → RS,m 7→ (Qd(m))Tm
is continuously differentiable in m. Assume further that the Jacobian ∂
∂m
fd(m) has a
zero eigenvalue with eigenvector m¯ and all other eigenvalues have strictly negative real
parts. Then there is a δ > 0 such that any solution of the myopic adjustment process (3)
with initial condition m0 ∈ P(S) ∩ Nδ(m¯) converges exponentially fast to m¯, i.e. there
are constants C1, C2 > 0 such that
||m(t)− m¯|| ≤ C1e−C2t for all t ≥ 0.
Remark 4.5. This result covers Theorem 4.2, however, the proof is non-constructive. In
particular, we cannot, in contrast to the setting of Theorem 4.2, explicitly describe δ.
The central idea of the proof has also been used in the analysis of nonlinear sinks in
Hirsch and Smale (1974), namely to bound ∂
∂t
||x(t)||B with x(t) = m(t)− m¯ for a suit-
able basis (and corresponding scalar product (i.e. 〈bi, bj〉 = δij) and norm). More pre-
cisely, since 〈x, y〉B = xTCy for any basis B we obtain a product rule ( ∂∂t〈g(t), h(t)〉B =〈
∂
∂t
g(t), h(t)
〉
B
+
〈
g(t), ∂
∂
h(t)
〉
B
) and using this
∂
∂t
||x(t)||B = ∂
∂
√
〈x(t), x(t)〉B = 1||x(t)||B 〈x˙(t), x(t)〉B.
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Also here the central step of the proof is to find a suitable constant C > 0 such that
1
||x(t)||B 〈x˙(t), x(t)〉B ≤ −C||x(t)||B.
However, it is not possible to directly use the techniques of Hirsch and Smale (1974)
because of the zero eigenvalue (which always occurs since Qd(m) is conservative).
Proof. Give RS new coordinates via the transformation x = m− m¯, which in particular
means that we now consider f˜d(x) = fd(x + m¯). Denote by A the Jacobian matrix of
f˜d at 0. Let λ1, . . . , λn be the eigenvalues of A. Without loss of generality λ1 = 0. By
assumption Re(λi) < 0 for all i ∈ {2, . . . , n}, moreover, there are constants b, c > 0 such
that Re(λi) < −b < −c for all i ∈ {2, . . . , n}.
By Hirsch and Smale (1974, Chapter 7) there is a basis
B = (b01, b
0
2, . . . , b
m(λ1)−1
2 , . . . , b
0
n, . . . , b
m(λn)−1
n )
with b01 = m¯ and corresponding inner product given by 〈bki , blj〉 = 1{i=j,k=l} such that
(i) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} the family (b0i , . . . , bm(λi)−1i ) is a basis of the generalized
eigenspace Eig(λi)
(ii) for all i ∈ {2, . . . , n} and x ∈ span(b0i , . . . , bm(λi)−1i ) we have 〈Ax, x〉B ≤ −b||x||2B.
We first obtain that for all vectors x =
∑n
i=2
∑m(λi)−1
k=0 α
k
i b
k
i for some constants (α
k
i ) we
have 〈Ax, x〉B ≤ −b||x||2B. Indeed, since Abji ∈ Eig(λi) we obtain
〈Ax, x〉B =
〈
A ·
 n∑
i=2
m(λi)−1∑
k=0
αki b
k
i
 , n∑
i=2
m(λi)−1∑
k=0
αki b
k
i
〉
B
=
n∑
i=2
〈
A
m(λi)−1∑
k=0
αki b
k
i
 ,m(λi)−1∑
k=0
αki b
k
i
〉
B
+
n∑
i=2
n∑
j=2,j 6=i
〈
m(λi)−1∑
k=0
αkiAb
k
i ,
m(λj)−1∑
k=0
αkj b
k
j
〉
B
(ii)
≤ −b
n∑
i=2
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣
m(λi)−1∑
k=0
αki b
k
i
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
B
+ 0
= −b
n∑
i=2
〈
m(λi)−1∑
k=0
αki b
k
i ,
m(λi)−1∑
k=0
αki b
k
i
〉
B
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= −b
〈
n∑
i=2
m(λi)−1∑
k=0
αki b
k
i ,
n∑
i=2
m(λi)−1∑
k=0
αki b
k
i
〉
B
= −b
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=2
m(λi)−1∑
k=0
αki b
k
i
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
B
.
As a next step we note that the set P(S) − m¯ := {x ∈ RS : ∃m ∈ P(S) : x = m − m¯}
is compact and that
(αki )i∈{1,...,n},k∈{1,...,m(λi)−1} 7→ α01m¯+
n∑
i=2
m(λi)−1∑
k=0
αki b
k
i
is a homeomorphism. Thus, also
P :=
(αki )i∈{1,...,n},k∈{1,...,m(λi)−i} ∈ RS : α01m¯+
n∑
i=2
m(λi)−1∑
k=0
αki b
k
i ∈ P(S)− m¯

is compact.
For x = α01m¯+
∑n
i=2
∑m(λi)−1
k=0 α
k
i b
k
i ∈ P(S)− m¯ we moreover obtain that
〈Ax, x〉B =
〈
A
α01m¯+ n∑
i=2
m(λi)−1∑
k=0
αki b
k
i
 , α01m¯+ n∑
i=2
m(λi)−1∑
k=0
αki b
k
i
〉
B
= (α01)
2〈Am¯, m¯〉B +
〈
α01Am¯,
n∑
i=2
m(λi)−1∑
l=0
αki b
k
i
〉
B
+
〈
n∑
i=2
m(λi)−1∑
k=0
αkiAb
k
i , α
1
0m¯
〉
B
+
〈
A ·
n∑
i=2
m(λi)−1∑
k=0
αki b
k
i ,
n∑
i=2
m(λi)−1∑
k=0
αki b
k
i
〉
B
= 0 + 0 + 0 +
〈
A ·
n∑
i=2
m(λi)−1∑
k=0
αki b
k
i ,
n∑
i=2
m(λi)−1∑
k=0
αki b
k
i
〉
B
≤ −b ·
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=2
m(λi)−1∑
k=0
αki b
k
i
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
B
= −b ·
∣∣∣∣∣∣∑ni=2∑m(λi)−1k=0 αki bki ∣∣∣∣∣∣2
B∣∣∣∣∣∣α01m¯+∑ni=2∑m(λi)−1k=0 αki bki ∣∣∣∣∣∣2
B︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:D(α)>0
·
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣α
0
1m¯+
n∑
i=2
m(λi)−1∑
k=0
αki b
k
i︸ ︷︷ ︸
=x
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
B
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≤ −b
(
min
α∈P
D(α)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:D>0
||x||2B
As a final preparation we note that, by the same reasoning as in the proof of Theorem
3.2, the set P(S) is flow invariant for m˙(t) = fd(m(t)). Thus, the set P(S)− m¯ is flow
invariant for x˙(t) = f˜d(x(t)).
By definition of the derivative (which in particular yields ||f˜d(x)− Ax||B ∈ o(||x||B) in
a neighbourhood of 0) and Cauchy’s inequality we have
0 = lim
x→0
||f˜d(x)− Ax||B
||x||B = limx→0
||f˜d(x)− Ax||B · ||x||B
||x||2B
≥ lim
x→0
〈f˜d(x)− Ax, x〉B
||x||2B
= 0.
Since for all x ∈ P(S) − m¯ we have 〈Ax, x〉B ≤ −bD||x||2B, there is a δ > 0 such that
for all x ∈ Nδ(0)∩ (P(S)− m¯) it holds that 〈f˜d(x), x〉B ≤ −cD||x||2B. If x˜ ∈ Nδ(0) such
that D(x˜+ m¯) 6= {d}, then make δ smaller such that D(x+ m¯) = {d} for all x ∈ P(S).
Now let x0 ∈ Nδ(0)∩ (P(S)−m¯). Then by Peano’s existence theorem there is a solution
x : [0,∞)→ RS of the initial value problem x˙(t) = f˜d(x(t)), x(0) = x0 and, furthermore,
any solution x : [0, t0)→ RS can be extended on [0,∞). Let x : [0, t0]→ RS be a solution
curve of the differential equation x˙(t) = f˜d(x(t)) in Nδ(0) and assume that x(t) 6= 0 for
all 0 ≤ t ≤ t0. (If x(t˜) = 0 for some t˜ ≥ 0, then x(t) = 0 for all t ≥ t˜.)
Then it holds that
∂
∂t
||x(t)||B = 1||x(t)||B 〈x˙(t), x(t)〉B ≤ −cD||x(t)||B, (5)
which means that ||x(t)||B is strictly decreasing on [0, t0]. Thus, x(t) ∈ Nδ(0) for all
t ∈ [t0, t0 + ˜]. Repeating this argument, we obtain by Hirsch and Smale (1974, Section
8.5) that x(t) ∈ Nδ(0) for all t ≥ 0. Furthermore, the estimate (5) yields that ||x(t)||B ≤
e−cDt||x(0)||B, which is the desired exponential convergence.
These theorems can be directly applied in examples: Indeed, we obtain for the con-
sumer choice model introduced in Section 3 and analysed in Neumann (2020a) that
local convergence happens to any deterministic stationary equilibrium where the equi-
librium distribution does not equal the boundary value k1 or k2, respectively. Also in a
simplified version of the corruption model of Kolokoltsov and Malafeyev (2017), which
has also been analysed in Neumann (2020a), we obtain local convergence for several
stationary equilibria having a deterministic equilibrium strategy that is unique for the
equilibrium point. More precisely, we obtain for any parameter choice local convergence
towards those deterministic stationary equilibria where the equilibrium distribution lies
in the interior of P(S) and for some parameter constellations we also obtain local conver-
gence towards the deterministic stationary equilibria where the equilibrium distribution
is (1, 0, 0) or (0, 1, 0).
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5. Global Convergence for a Two Strategy Setting
The question of global convergence “Given an arbitrary initial condition m0 ∈ P(S) does
any trajectory converge towards some mean field equilibrium?” is much more complex.
Here we provide a statement for the case that U := {d ∈ Ds : D(m) = {d}} consists
of exactly two strategies, i.e. U = {d1, d2}. The statement does not directly yield the
desired convergence statement, instead we only obtain convergence towards equilibria
with a deterministic equilibrium strategy or that the trajectory remains in a set where
the two strategies from U are simultaneously optimal. However, relying on example-
specific properties, we can then often prove the convergence towards the mixed strategy
equilibria by hand.
If U = {d1, d2} then the differential inclusion (3) describing the myopic adjustment
process simplifies substantially: Define
g(m) :=
(
V d
2
(m)− V d1(m)
)
·1 =
(
(βI −Qd2(m))−1rd2(m)− (βI −Qd1(m))−1rd1(m)
)
·1
and assume that g is twice continuously differentiable, i.e. assume that Qija and ria are
twice continuously differentiable for all i, j ∈ S and a ∈ A on some open superset O of
P(S). Then
F (m) :=

(∑
i∈S miQ
d1
ij (m)
)
j∈S
g(m) < 0
conv
{(∑
i∈S miQ
d1
ij (m)
)
j∈S
,
(∑
i∈S miQ
d2
ij (m)
)
j∈S
}
g(m) = 0(∑
i∈S miQ
d2
ij (m)
)
j∈S
g(m) > 0
.
This means, that on g(m) 6= 0 the trajectory is the trajectory of a nonlinear Markov
chain with generator Qd
1
(·) whenever g(m) < 0 and Qd2(·) whenever g(m) > 0. These
processes are a generalization of a classical Markov chain with the new feature that
the transition probabilities do not only depend on the current state, but also on the
current distribution of the process. For more details consider Kolokoltsov (2010) and (in
particular regarding the long-term behaviour) Neumann (2020b). Thus, the processes
are characterized through the transition probabilities (Pij(t,m))i,j∈S , which describe the
probability to be in state j and time t when at time 0 the state was i and the distribution
was 0, or (non-uniquely) through the marginal distributions Φti(m), which describes the
probability to be in state i at time t when the initial distribution was m. One can show
that it is indeed sufficient to characterize a nonlinear Markov chain through a nonlinear
generator, that is a Lipschitz continuous function Q : P(S)→ RS×S such that Q(m) is
a conservative generator for all m ∈ P(S).
In the following theorem, we desire that the considered nonlinear Markov chains behave
well in the long-term. As in the theory of standard Markov chains, the invariant dis-
tribution is a central tool for this analysis and it solves the (now non-linear) equation
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0 = Q(m)mT . However, a weaker condition than classical ergodicity is enough. Indeed,
it suffices to require that the nonlinear Markov chain converges in the limit towards some
invariant distribution, that is that for all m0 ∈ P(S) there is an invariant distribution
m¯(m0) such that
lim
t→∞
||Φt(m0)− m¯(m0)|| = 0.
This condition is indeed weaker than ergodicity, see Neumann (2020b, Section 4.2).
With these preparations, we are able to formulate and prove the global convergence
theorem:
Theorem 5.1. Assume that for all m ∈ O such that g(m) = 0 it holds that ∇g(m) 6=
0. Furthermore, assume that the nonlinear Markov chains with transition rate matrix
functions Qd
1
(m) and Qd
2
(m) converge in the limit towards some stationary distribution.
(i) If for all m ∈ O such that g(m) = 0 it holds that
〈(Qd1(m))Tm,∇g(m)〉 > 0 and 〈(Qd2(m))Tm,∇(−g)(m)〉 < 0,
then the myopic adjustment processes converges towards some stationary mean
field equilibrium with deterministic equilibrium strategy from U .
(ii) If for all m ∈ O such that g(m) = 0 it holds that
〈(Qd1(m))Tm,∇g(m)〉 < 0 and 〈(Qd2(m))Tm,∇(−g)(m)〉 > 0,
then the myopic adjustment processes converges towards some stationary mean
field equilibrium with deterministic equilibrium strategy from U .
(iii) If for all m ∈ O such that g(m) = 0 it holds that
〈(Qd1(m))Tm,∇g(m)〉 ≥ 0 and 〈(Qd2(m))Tm,∇(−g)(m)〉 ≥ 0,
then the myopic adjustment process either converges towards a deterministic sta-
tionary mean field equilibrium with equilibrium strategy from U or there is a T > 0
such that the processes satisfies g(m(t)) = 0 for all t > T .
The gradient conditions of the theorem have an intuition: More precisely, the conditions
in case (i) state that when g(m) = 0 the population distribution heads to the set where
the strategy d1 is optimal, and the conditions in case (ii) state that when g(m) = 0 the
population distribution heads to the set where the strategy d2 is optimal. In case (iii)
the conditions say, that when g(m) = 0 and the population chooses d1 the distribution
tends into the set where d2 is optimal and when g(m) = 0 and the population chooses
d2 the distribution tends into the set where d1 is optimal.
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Proof of Theorem 5.1. We first note that if there is a T ≥ 0 such that the trajectory
satisfies g(m(t)) < 0 or g(m(t)) > 0 for all t ≥ T , then the solution of (3) is also
a solution of m˙(t) = Qd
1
(m(t)) or m˙(t) = Qd
2
(m(t)), respectively, which means that
(m(t))t≥T are the marginals of a nonlinear Markov chain. By assumption, we thus obtain
convergence towards some stationary point, which is, since g(m(t)) < 0 or g(m(t)) > 0
for all t ∈ [T,∞), a stationary equilibrium.
In case (i) whenever g(m(T )) = 0 for some T ≥ 0, then g(m(t)) > 0 for all t ≥ T .
Indeed, assume that g(m(t)) = 0 for all t ∈ [T, T + ] for some  > 0. Then for almost
all t ∈ [T, T + ] it holds that
∂
∂t
g(m(t)) =
〈
λQd
1
(m(t))Tm(t) + (1− λ)Qd2(m(t))Tm(t),∇g(m(t))
〉
> 0,
which is a contradiction. Similarly, if we assume that g(m(t)) < 0 for all t ∈ (T, T + )
with  > 0, then it holds for almost all t ∈ (T, T + ) that
∂
∂t
g(m(t)) =
〈
Qd
1
(m(t))Tm(t),∇g(m(t))
〉
> 0,
again a contradiction. Thus, it either holds that g(m(t)) < 0 for all t ≥ 0 or that
g(m(t)) > 0 for all t ≥ T with T ≥ 0, which by the first observation yields the desired
convergence.
In case (iii) we have that whenever g(m(T )) = 0 for some T ≥ 0, then g(m(t)) = 0
for all t ≥ T . Indeed, assume that there is a T˜ := inf{t ≥ T : g(m(t)) 6= 0} < ∞.
If T˜ = inf{t ≥ T : g(m(t)) < 0}, then since m is absolutely continuous and g is
continuously differentiable, we obtain for some 1 > 0 that
0 >
∂
∂t
g(m(t)) = 〈Qd1(m(t))Tm(t),∇g(m(t)) ≥ 0
for almost all t ∈ [T˜ , T˜ + 1], a contradiction. Similarly, if T˜ = inf{t ≥ T : g(m(t)) > 0},
then we obtain for some 2 > 0 that
0 <
∂
∂t
g(m(t)) = 〈Qd2(m(t))Tm(t)),∇g(m(t)) ≤ 0
for all t ∈ [T˜ , T˜ + 2], a contradiction. Thus, either g(m(t)) < 0 for all t ≥ 0, or
g(m(t)) > 0 for all t ≥ 0, in which case we obtain convergence towards some stationary
equilibrium with a deterministic equilibrium strategy, or there is a T > 0 such that
g(m(t)) = 0 for all t ≥ T .
Example 5.2. Let us consider the following example, which consists of two “good” states,
where a positive reward is earned, and one “bad” state, where no reward is earned. The
agents in the “good” state face congestion effects, namely there is a risk, increasing in
the share of individuals in that state, to go to the “bad” state. The control options are
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to switch between the two good states. One can interpret this model as a stylized version
to model the choice between two mobile phone providers, where the customer faces the
risk of a breakdown in connection that increases in the share of customers using the
same provider. For simplicity, we assume that agents in the “bad” state have no choice
option, but recover into each of the two states with equal probability.
1:1P 2:1P
3:0P
b/0
b/0
em2 + 
λem1 + 
λ
Figure 2: Representation of Example 5.2
The formal characterization is given by S = {1, 2, 3} and A = {change, stay} together
with
Q··change =
−(b+ em1 + ) b em1 + b −(b+ em2 + ) em2 + 
λ λ −2λ

Q··stay =
−(em1 + ) 0 em1 + 0 −(em2 + ) em2 + 
λ λ −2λ

and r·stay = r·change = (1, 1, 0), where all constants are strictly positive. A visualization
of the model is given in Figure 5.2.
In Neumann (2019) it is shown that there are infinitely many mixed strategy equilibria
with equilibrium distribution(√
4λ2 + 8λ+ 2 − 2λ− 
2
,
√
4λ2 + 8λ+ 2 − 2λ− 
2
,
4+ 4λ−√4λ2 + 8λ+ 2
2
)
19
with equilibrium strategies satisfying pi1,change = pi2,change .
To apply Theorem 5.1 we first note, that in Neumann (2020b) it is shown that the
relevant Markov chains are strongly ergodic and thus, converges to some limit dis-
tribution. Moreover, choosing U = {{change} × {stay}, {stay} × {change}}, O =
(− 
b
,∞)× (− 
b
,∞)× R and g(m) = m1 −m2 we obtain that〈
Qcs(m))Tm,∇− g(m)〉 = 2bm2 ≥ 0 and 〈Qsc(m))Tm,∇g(m)〉 = 2bm2 ≥ 0.
Thus, Theorem 5.1 yields that either convergence towards a stationary equilibrium with
an equilibrium strategy from U happens or that there is a T ≥ 0 such that g(m(t)) = 0
for all t ≥ T . Since there is no stationary equilibrium with a equilibrium strategy from
U it is clear that there is a T ≥ 0 such that g(m(t)) = 0 for all t ≥ T , which means that
m1(t) = m2(t) for all t ≥ T . Thus, also m˙1(t) = m˙2(t). By (3), this yields that
− pi1,change(t)bm1(t)− em1(t)2 − m1(t) + pi2,change(t)bm1(t) + λm3(t)
= pi1,change(t)bm1(t)− pi2,change(t)bm1(t)− em1(t)2 − m1(t) + λm3(t),
i.e. − pi1,change(t)bm1(t) + pi2,change(t)bm1(t) = 0.
Thus, for almost all t ≥ T the trajectory of the myopic adjustment process has to satisfy
m˙1(t) = −em1(t)2 − (+ 2λ)m1(t) + λ,
which is a Riccati equation, for which [0, 1] is flow invariant and for which a unique
classical solution for any initial condition m0 ∈ [0, 1] exists. Numerical simulations
indicate that in our setting with initial conditions m0 ∈ [0, 1] convergence towards the
distribution of the stationary mixed strategy equilibria is likely. 4
A. Appendix
Proof of Theorem 3.2. We show that the conditions of Lemma 5.1 in Deimling (1992)
are satisfied, as this yields the desired existence statement. More precisely, we show in
the following that
(i) F is upper semicontinuous,
(ii) F (m) is a closed, convex set for all m ∈ P(S),
(iii) there is a constant c > 0 such that ||F (m)|| := sup{||y|| : y ∈ F (m)} ≤ c(1+ ||m||)
for all m ∈ P(S), and
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(iv) F (m) ∩ TP(S)(m) 6= ∅ for all M ∈ P(S) where
TP(S)(m) =
{
y ∈ RS : lim inf
h↓0
d(m+ hy,P(S))
h
= 0
}
=
{
y ∈ RS : yi ≥ 0∀i ∈ S s.t. mi = 0 ∧
∑
i∈S
yi = 0
}
(Aubin and Cellina, 1984, Proposition 5.1.7).
(i): Let m ∈ P(S) and let N ⊆ RS be an open set such that F (m) ⊆ N . Since 2RS
equipped with the Hausdorff distance H(·, ·) is a metric space, it suffices to consider sets
of the form N = N(F (m)) with  > 0. Since D(m) = {d ∈ Ds : V d(m) = V ∗(m)}, we
find for any d′ ∈ Ds \ D(m) a constant cd′ > 0 such that V d′(m) < V ∗ − cd′ . Therefore
by finiteness of Ds, the constant c = mind∈Ds\D(m) cd′ > 0 satisfies V d
′
(m) < V ∗(m)− c
for all d′ ∈ Ds \ D(m). Since V d : P(S) → RS is continuous for every d ∈ Ds, there
is a δd > 0 such that m˜ ∈ Nδd(m) ⇒ ||V d(m˜) − V d(m)|| < c3 . In particular, choosing
δ1 := mind∈Dd δd we obtain for all m˜ ∈ Nδ1(m) and all d′ ∈ Ds \ D(m) that pointwise
V ∗(m˜)− V d′(m˜) ≥ (V ∗(m˜)− V ∗(m)) +
(
V ∗(m)− V d′(m)
)
+
(
V d
′
(m)− V d′(m˜
)
> − c
3
+ c− c
3
> 0.
Thus, d′ /∈ D(m˜), that is D(m˜) ⊆ D(m). Furthermore, for d ∈ Ds the map F d : P(S)→
RS, m 7→ (∑i∈S∑a∈AmiQija(m)dia)j∈S is continuous. Therefore, there is a δ2,d > 0
such that m˜ ∈ Nδ2,d(m) ⇒ ||F d(m˜) − F d(m)|| < . Set δ2 = mind∈Ds δ2,d Then for
δ := min{δ1, δ2} it holds that m˜ ∈ Nδ(m)⇒ F (m˜) ⊆ N(F (m)).
(ii) Since for all m ∈ P(S) the set F (m) is convex polytope, it is closed and convex.
(iii) Since Qija(·) is Lipschitz continuous for all i, j ∈ S and all a ∈ A it is moreover
uniformly bounded in m ∈ P(S), i, j ∈ S and a ∈ A by some constant, which we denote
by M . Thus, for all d ∈ Ds ⊇ D(m) we have
||F d(m)|| =
∑
j∈S
∣∣∣∣∣∑
i∈S
∑
a∈A
miQija(m)dia
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤∑
j∈S
∑
i∈S
∑
a∈A
miMdia = SM,
which implies, since F (m) is a convex hull of (F d(m))d∈D(m) that ||F (m)||1 ≤ SM .
(iv) The condition is trivially satisfied for all m ∈ int(P(S)) since then TP(S)(m) = RS
and F (m) 6= ∅ because D(m) 6= ∅. Now, let m ∈ ∂P(S) be a boundary point. Then
there is at least one j ∈ S such that mj = 0. Since the only non-positive column entry
of Q·ja(m) is in row j, this implies that F d(m)j ≥ 0. Moreover,∑
j∈S
F d(m)j =
∑
i∈S
∑
∈A
(∑
j∈S
Qija(m)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
dia = 0,
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which yields that F d(m) ∈ TP(S)(m). Since F (m) is a convex combination of F d(m) and
TP(S)(m) is convex, the desired claim follows.
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